This paper uses a structural approach to examine who matches with whom.
Introduction
Studies of who matches with whom have been applied to various markets such as legal market, labor market, sports market, and marriage market.
1 How individuals sort themselves into marriage, in particular, has important implications for the distribution of income, labor supply, and fertility (Pencavel (1996) , Boulier and Rosensweig (1984) , and Becker (1973) ). Most empirical works on who matches with whom in the marriage market have been descriptive in nature (Keller et al. (1996 ), Spuhler (1982 , and Vandenberg (1972) ). These studies are largely based on a reduced-form approach using spousal correlation indices for various traits. But such an approach is and inadequate in explaining individuals' sorting outcomes. For example, evidence shows a low spousal correlation for wages, as compared with other traits such as age and education. 2 Does this imply that wage is not an important trait in individuals' preferences? Or does it re ‡ect that the marriage market is in ‡exible, so agents scramble for partners of various wage attributes instead of being selective?
Observations of who matches with whom contain more information than a simple association of spousal traits. They contain valuable information on how e¢ciently the marriage market functions and on agents' preferences in terms of mate choice.
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But a reduced-form approach cannot address market e¢ciency or agents' preferences that a¤ect the value of marriage. A better understanding of who matches with whom calls for a structural investigation.
Dynamic two-sided matching models provide an appealing framework for analyz-1 For example, Spurr (1987) studies positive assortative mating between the size of law …rms (legal claims) and lawyers' quality. Oi (1983) studies the matching between the number of entrepreneur and workers' productivity. Rosen (1981) shows that technological change leads gifted athletes to match with larger audience. Becker (1973) proves that men and women are positively sorted in complementary traits.
2 Census evidence on spousal correlation in terms of wage, age, and education for newlyweds is provided in the appendix. 3 Hereafter I use ‡exibility and e¢ciency interchangeably.
ing partnership formation among heterogeneous individuals whose utility is nontransferable. 4 They also o¤er a structure that characterizes the stochastic processes governing partners' arrival/separation and the choice of partners Coles (1999, 1997) and Collins and McNamara (1990) ). Given these frictions, equilibrium matching outcomes are driven by the underlying assumption of match utility/production, which a¤ects individuals' outside options. Because two-sided matching models are relatively new, little is known about structural estimation in this context. This paper examines who matches with whom using a structural approach based on the framework of two-sided matching models. Because the model is capable of answering how market e¢ciency and individuals' preferences a¤ect who marries whom, the results give more insights into individuals' behavior than those using the simple method of spousal correlation for traits. Using the PSID , results indicate that the marriage market for white men is more ‡exible than that for black men.
Across various age groups, the ‡exibility of the marriage market decreases with age for white men. Wage is a more desirable trait for marriageability in younger than older white men. Education is a more marriageble trait for black men, but the e¤ects of age for black men are mixed.
The proposed estimation method enables me to include more than one trait as individuals' types and to account for classi…cation errors. 5 These two measures are less likely to be implementable in a simple correlation index. Results reject the use of one trait as individuals' overall type. More important, results indicate that inattention to classi…cation errors leads to false predictions of marriage market in ‡exibility 4 Dynamic two-sided models are used in this paper instead of static and frictionless two-sided models such as that of Gale and Shapley (1962) because the theory of stable matching is di¢cult to reconcile with facts such as the rising divorce rate. Moreover, in static models agents' preferences are idiosyncratic and consequently the link between equilibrium allocation and preferences is unclear.
5 Because some traits are excluded (either due to data unavailability or unobservability by the econometrician), classi…cation errors are used in the estimation. and the inaccurate conclusion that wage is undesirable. Once classi…cation errors are accounted for, the marriage market is more ‡exible, and wage is found to be a more desirable measure of marriageability than education for white men. As temporal income (wage) is a more desirable trait for white men, white men are more impatient than black men, whose marriageability relies more on the permanent income of education. This result is consistent with the …nding that the marriage market is more ‡exible for white men.
Empirical results are based on a two-sided matching framework in the spirit of Burdett and Coles (1997) and Collins and MaNamara (1990) , where individuals' match utility is nontransferable and matching is random. In the model, agents are ex ante heterogeneous, with each represented by a marriage index. Finding potential matches is a time-consuming process, characterized by scarcity of information. Given such a costly matching process generated by search friction, a range of acceptable potential partners is possible. Agents choose an acceptable set of partners to maximize expected wealth. The equilibrium of who matches with whom is a¤ected by the structural parameters that characterize the distribution of the marriage index and the frequency of agents' marriage market transitions.
Estimation of the structural parameters of a matching model is done where observed couples are considered as an equilibrium outcome. The estimation method developed in this paper improves on empirical works describing who matches with whom in the following ways. First, the method of ranking agents based on multiple measured attributes such as wage and education is more general than using a single trait as agents' types in standard literature (Montgomery and Sulak (1986) , and Boulier and Rosensweig (1984) ). Second, to account for omitted variables and unobserved traits (by the econometrician), a ‡exible classi…cation error model is developed.
Third, the method of estimation is straight-forward. Given a distribution of agents' marriage indices and the frequency of marriage market contacts and separations, the acceptable pool of partners for each type of agent can be solved numerically following an optimal reservation-match policy. The numerical solution is then nested within a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate structural parameters. The estimation technique is applied to samples of the PSID. Since the probability of who matches with whom and the spell length of looking for partners are endogenously determined by the optimal strategy, I show that observations of the age at …rst marriage and the characteristics of matched partners provide information on identifying structural parameters.
Fourth, individual marriage history is used rather than census data, which record a stock of individuals at a given point in time. The advantage of using marriage history data is two-fold. Agents' marriageable traits are drawn at the time of marriage because a pool of single agents is followed until they get married. This avoids the problems in most studies that use post-marriage characteristics from a census.
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These problems include division of labor within a family that may a¤ect choices of occupation and the labor supply, so post-marriage wage may be correlated with marital choice. Another advantage of using panel data is that the structure of data allows a direct application to the dynamic nature of the model, thereby allowing direct testings of the model's assumptions, and hence, testing of its usefulness. This paper is similar to Coles (1999, 1997) , Bloch and Ryder (1998) , and Collins and McNamura (1990) that study partnership formation among heterogeneous agents. But unlike those and as in Smith (1997) , this paper utilizes productive aspects of marriage. In this paper, agents are productive while single and while married. Further, unlike Bloch and Ryder (1998) , who assume cloning, I assume 6 See for example, Suen and Lui (1999) , Bergstrom and Schoeni (1996) , Montgomery and Sulak (1986) , and Boulier and Rosensweig (1984) . exogenous separation to achieve steady state singlehood distribution. I choose exogenous separation because it is more realistic than cloning, and it gets rid of the second in…nity problem.
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This paper is similar in technology to Mortensen and Neumann (1988) in the sense that the reservation function is computed as a …xed point of a contraction map.
Mortensen and Neumann perform Monte Carlo evidence on the properties of structural estimation of a homogeneous search model when solving for exact reservation wage. This paper is also similar to typical applications in search models and equilibrium search models such as that of Bontemps et al. (1999) , Bunzel et al. (1997) , and Kiefer and Neumann (1993) in two ways. First, these studies consider steady-state reservation solution and the estimation of structural parameters in a continuous time and in…nite horizon model. Second, these applications take workers' labor market history and the accepted wage at employment to identify the intensity parameters in the stochastic processes and to determine the endogenous productivity distribution or wage distribution. In this paper, identi…cation requires knowledge of agents' marriage history and their characteristics at the time of the formation of matches.
Such formulation allows one to test the restrictive assumptions on the memoryless properties of partners' arrival and separation rates made in the model. The matching model is outlined in section 2. Section 3 contains a discussion of the empirical implementation of the model. The structural model is estimated by maximum likelihood. I derive the likelihood function of the matching model in subsection 3.1; then in subsection 3.2, I propose a discrete index as an attempt to rank agents' measured attributes. I present a matching algorithm in subsection 3.3. I close the section by deriving estimation strategies that take into account classi…cation errors in estimation. Section 4 contains a description of the data. Estimation results are given in section 5. I present estimates of partners' arrival rate, separation rate, and wage elasticity for distinct age categories. Section 6 concludes. A type agent chooses a range of acceptable types of potential partners with the objective of maximizing his expected discounted value in the future utility stream.
The Matching Model
A single agent has instantaneous utility , and the expected bene…t of marriage following an optimal policy if partner type is realized, given that a partner has arrived. If agents discount future income at rate , the value of being single is
where ( ) is the expected discounted value of marriage with a random partner of type The ex post value of marriage is made up of the match utility given by the equal split of the realized match production and the value of remaining single due to an exponential random separation,
A marriage proposal is acceptable if the potential partner is above the value of the reservation type of type . Let represent the ranking of so = Not all potential partners whose type is above accept marriage proposals o¤ered by given agents in equilibrium. Some potential partners are simply unattainable because they may prefer not to match with lower type agents. This feature is the equilibrium outcome of the model and not a restriction. Denote be the value of the 9 The in…mum ( ) must be at least as large as 2 to satisfy the incentive constraint for marriage: that the match utility is at least as large as the utility while single, 2 = ( 2 = ) Should this constraint fail to hold, a fraction of each sex will not be married. maximum-attainable type and be the ranking of so = The acceptance set of a type agent is = f j = = g. The probability of acceptance is
The optimal policy is a reservation-match policy given by:
If a marriage o¤er falls within the agent's acceptance set, the agent will accept the match proposal following the optimal policy; otherwise, the o¤er will be rejected.
Combining equations (1), (2), and the optimal policy, the reservation type is the solution to the following equation (see appendix for derivation)
The solution is unique because the left-hand side of equation (3) is increasing in and the right-hand side decreasing. Since the situation is symmetric between men and women, the reservation type for women satis…es
A Nash equilibrium of matching requires that (i) each agent …nd a potential partner acceptable, and (ii) every single agent select his(her) own partner type to maximize the expected net bene…t ‡ow attributable to the choice of partner following (3) (or (4)), given the optimal choices made by all other single agents. In other words, two sets of joint matching strategies for men and women: f g f g for all = 1 that solve (3) and (4) are Nash equilibrium solutions to the non-cooperative stationary game of matching. 10 The equilibrium solution is a twodimensional graph.
Positive assortative matching, i.e., a positive relation between reservation types 10 For a prove of the existence of the equilibrium, see Smith (1997) .
and agents' own types, is the predicted equilibrium outcome. This result is driven by the underlying speci…cations of agents' output, which is agents' type when single and the product of each partner's type when married The match output encompasses increasing returns to scale as an important gain from marriage. This property is necessary to create incentives to trade with higher type agents to exploit match rents when narcissism is allowed. When utility of being single is agents' own types, waiting for higher type partners are less costly, and agents who were previously accepting lower type partners will prefer to wait for higher type partners. Agents' outside options must be su¢ciently high to induce positive assortative matching. If a constant returns to scale match output such as p or + is assumed, negative assortative matching arises. 11 When agents do not value their singlehood utility or when search friction is absent, increasing returns to scale is not necessary to induce positive assortative matching.
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In this model an increase in reservation type can be explained by either a rise in the arrival rate of partners, a fall in the separation rate, or a combination of both.
The ratio + can be thought of as a measure of the inverse of search friction. This is a ratio of partners' arrival rate to the sum of the discount rate and separation rate, and so it measures the relative speed of o¤ers. As ! 1, partners arrive instantaneously. Friction disappears, each type of agent matches with his/her most desirable type, and strict positive assortative matching results, as in a centralized market. When chances to meet partners are low, ! 0, all agents are least selective.
For values of between zero and in…nity, a range of partner types is acceptable.
Estimation Strategy
The object of interest is to estimate the likelihood of a type agent marrying a type agent. The method used is maximum likelihood, for two reasons. First, the outcome of the matching model endogenously generates an acceptance set for each type of agent, which allows the derivation of the probability of who matches with whom.
Second, the assumptions underlying the model enable derivations of the distributions of duration data.
The Likelihood Function
Identi…cation of all parameters requires knowledge of couples' characteristics at …rst marriage as well as an individual's marriage history. All agents are single at the …rst interview, whence information on how long they have been single can be obtained.
Information on the duration of singlehood is obtained by following single agents after the …rst interview. Analogous to the renewal theory, these durations are backward and forward recurrence times respectively. Therefore, the duration of singlehood is 0 = 0 + 0 The data consist of a panel where some individuals are single with duration 0 married with duration 1 and a given individual's and spouse's logarithm of wage and education at …rst marriage are and respectively. Assume that the parameters of males and females are the same, the structural parameters to be estimated are and Consider a type man who is single at …rst interview. Let and be i.i.d. and
have an exponential distribution with parameter ( ¡ ) Let ( ) denote a binary variable that equals one, if it is known that the elapsed (residual) duration exceeds a certain value, i.e., left-censored (right-censored), and zero otherwise. Conditioned on being type the individual contribution of singlehood duration until and including the time of exit into marriage or censoring is
where 0 0 and 0 0.
Events occurring after exit from being singlehood are independent of the events up to exit. Therefore, their probability is independent of the likelihood of being singlehood. The event immediately following type 's singlehood duration is the realization of whom to match with. This event is given by the density of accepted type,
Let be the number of type agents and
be the number of potential partners acceptable to a type man, where ( 2 ) is an indicator function equaling one if a type woman is acceptable to a type man.
The acceptance criterion of a type man is endogenously determined by solving (3) and (4). Given a type man, the probability that the type man matches with a type woman is the number of type women out of all types of women acceptable to a type man,
Conditional on the realized partner type, marriage duration 1 has an exponential distribution with parameter If 0 = 1 I do not follow the individual any longer.
Let 2 = 1 if 1 be right-censored, and equal zero otherwise. If 0 = 0 then a type individual's likelihood contribution to events between entering marriage and separation equals
where 1 0 The total type individual likelihood contribution for a respondent who is single at the time of the …rst interview equals the product of (5) and (7) that describes the odds of each type man who initially is single, matching with a type partner with a marriage o¤er, followed by the marriage dissolving exogenously:
Since observations of each type of men are independent, if denotes the ¡ observation of men, the likelihood function of the benchmark model is
where = 1 and = 1 2
Before launching the likelihood estimation, two operations must be performed.
The …rst is to rank an individual's type based on observed data. The second is to obtain the analytical acceptance set for each type of individual based on the model. Therefore, the likelihood function must nest within it a matching algorithm to solve for the acceptance set of each type of individual based on (3) and (4).
The Marriage Index
Types are marriage indices of individuals. To estimate the model in a manageable way, I assume types are generated by two measured attributes: the individual's logarithm of wage and education . 13 Then I rank individuals into discrete categories according to the following steps:
14 (a) Generate as a function of and 13 Classi…cation errors are introduced in subsection 3.4. 14 Since the procedures of constructing "type" to each sex is the same, I drop the gender subscript.
where is a scaler parameter. measures the sensitivity of spousal demand of a change in wages. If spousal demand is sensitive to a change in wage, then wage re ‡ects a more important marriageable characteristic relative to education. (c) The set of within each ¡ interval is mapped to following the rule:
The real-valued represents a type individual, which is a piece-wise constant within the corresponding ¡ interval of (1) = = ( ) . Thus, given , , and , ( ) ( ) and the corresponding empirical type distributions are generated.
The Matching Algorithm
Equilibrium matching sets are endogenously determined in the model. The Matching Algorithm
Step 1 For the highest type of men and women, set the maximum-attainable type to .
Step 2 Use equations (3) and (4) to solve for for the highest type of men and women respectively. f = = g £ f = = g de…nes the …rst acceptance area.
Step 3 Case 2. is unidenti…able. This occurs when f j = g is empty for a 0 In this case, we reverse the role of and and solve for f g aiming at determining the acceptance sets of additional = ¡ 1 ¡ 2 , until the …rst woman accepts the ¡ man, i.e., = However, to solve for f g we need to be able to determine = max 0 f j = g which may not be possible if the set is empty. If we hit an empty set of f j = g before obtaining = reset to and to at the point of failure and repeat step 2 again.
Stopping Criterion: We have solved for all acceptable sets of partners for type and . If there are remaining types of or that have not been matched, they will be assigned a null acceptance area (no matching possible.)
Classi…cation Errors
Wage and education alone may not be the only traits that matter in mate choice.
Other traits, whether observed or not by the econometrician, may be important. One way to handle this issue is to get more information, but it can be costly. Alternatively, I use a classi…cation error model.
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The classi…cation error model proposed here is simple and ‡exible. Let and denote the true type for and respectively. Let be the density of classi…cation error for a type agent, and be the density of classi…cation error for a type agent
Because classi…cation is assumed to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive, the sum of the probabilities for a given observed category is 1, i.e., P = 1. Let Q denote a £ matrix of the probability of all possible classi…cation errors, with elements
The exhaustive assumption forms a total of restrictions on possible values for Thus, Q has a total of ( ¡ 1) free parameters.
To reduce the parameter space, I consider the problem of classi…cation errors in terms of the distance between true and observed type in the following way. Let ( ) = j ¡ j be the distance between the true type and the observed type , and ( ) denotes the classi…cation error with distance equals to I make two assumptions.
Assumption 1. The probability of misclassifying an individual is the same for 15 From a technical standpoint, a classi…cation error model is needed. The reason is that (6) indicates estimates must accomodate the selection constraint ( 2 ) = 0, otherwise, the contribution to the likelihood function (9) is zero. Imposing such a condition distorts parameter estimates, and estimation from the model may yield misleading conclusions. Consider a marriage market in which most people match with partners of similar types, except a few serious outliers, e.g., the highest type matches with the lowest type. Then, parameter estimates must accommodate the matching of extreme types, and the matching model implies that a su¢ciently low partners arrival rate is necessary to sustain all couplings. Thus, instead of obtaining estimates that support sorting of partners of similar types, estimation results would yield estimates that produce acceptance probability equal to one, search friction would be erroneously high, and assortative matching would be erroneously low. 1 (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 2 (1) (0) (1) (2) (3) 3 (2) (1) (0) 4 (3) (2) .
(4) (3)
.
. 9 (8) .
(9) (0)
If types are observed without errors, Q is a diagonal matrix with elements equal one, i.e., (0) = 1 and ( ) = 0 for 0 Since there are at most 10 errors: (0)
16 The error structure is assumed to be symmetric between men and women, and so parameters of the classi…cation errors are identical for men and women. The forthcoming discussions on apply to
(1) (9) the parameter space is reduced to 9. In general. this restriction reduces the number of free parameters from ( ¡ 1) to ( ¡ 1). Note that the exhaustive condition gives rise to the following equality,
where A represents a 10 £ 10 matrix containing the number of occurrence of error probabilities associated with each element of a 10£1 vector q = ( (0) (1) 
(1)
(8) 
Clearly, rank A is 5 = 10 The solution to q is: 
However, not any solution of 1 5 is admissable. The solutions for 1 5 have to be chosen such that the following two conditions must be satis…ed: (a) 1 2 3 4 5 0, and (b) 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 3 + 2 4 + 5 = 1
Formally, let the classi…cation errors for type and agents, 1 and 2 be independently and identically distributed, where = + 1 and = + 2 . Further, let the density of classi…cation error for type and agents be (j 1 j) and (j 2 j)
respectively. For all sample of men, the likelihood function adjusted for classi…cation errors, satisfying (13), (a), and (b), is
where = 1 10 = 1 2 10 = 10 and = 1 Ducan et al. (1991) documents the representativeness of the PSID after 17 years from 1968. They …nd that there is a serious problem of attrition and most of the original households are not represented by respondents in 1968. However, the samples still have comparable mean charactersitics to these in 1968. 19 The initial condition problem is solved by Chamberlain (1979) which the random e¤ect distribution is conditioned on forward recurrence information. Ondrich (1985) controls for heterogeneity assuming that both unemployment and employment spells have Weibull Distribution with a parametric unobserved heterogeneity. Results from an exponential model and Cox's Proportional hazard model reveal that there is a signi…cant heterogeneity in the duration of being single in my sample. Heterogeneity in my model is captured by the acceptance selection of each individual type, assuming that 0. 20 Age 15 is used because it is the o¢cial Census de…nition for the marriageable age (see Statistical Abstract 1996 for details.) Moreover, my sample does not contain respondents who married at ages younger than 15, and only 2 cases of zero single duration spells, so the choice of 15 as starting age does not seem unreasonable.
21 I decode the interval data of education in 1968-1974 and 1985-1990 , using auxillary relations with the 1980 Annual Demographic March CPS data.
22 I use the 5th and the 95th percentiles from the set of hourly wages for paid hourly workers from the March outgoing rotation groups for each year. 23 Because 27 percent of married women in the sample did not work, I compute potential wages for them using Heckman's two-step procedure. To correct for the selectivity bias, I estimate a participation probit using the standard Heckman procedure. The probit equation contains all variables in the wage equation and the number of children. The wage equation is controlled for by husbands' and wives' ages, ages squared, education, region dummies, city populations, and husbands' wages. The wage equation and the probit equation are estimated separately by race.
Data Description
There are …ve race groups in the sample: whites, blacks, Chinese, Japanese, and American Indians. Due to the small observation of some groups, I focus on white and black men only.
24 Table 1 contains sample characteristics on average durations of being singles (uncensored spells only), average wages and education at …rst marriage, average durations of marriage (including censored spells), and the proportion of complete singlehood spells and marriage spells strati…ed by race. The data reveal that on average, white men take a shorter time (1.11 years) to search for spouses than black men. The duration of marriages for white men is longer.
The proportion of the complete (or interrupted) marriage spell for white men is 11.2 percent, which is 3.7 percent higher than that for black men. Wage and education data tell the conventional story: blacks earn less and have lower education levels than whites. Matchings of whites are more assortative in wage and education than those of blacks.
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Results
Estimation results are based on categorizing agents into ten types, i.e., = 10 and setting = 0 05 My estimation strategy is applied to three speci…cations of in order to separate out the contributions of wage and education in explaining who matches with whom: = 1, 0 and (0 1) Tables 2 and 3 show the estimated results for white and black men respectively.
When wage is used as the marriage index (row 6 in tables 2 and 3), white men are about 4.5 times more likely than black men to contact partners. 26 The separation rate is also higher for white men. The marriage market for white men is more than four times as ‡exible (24.24 versus 5.87) as that for black men, indicating more assortative matching for white men. This result is consistent with data showing that white men had higher correlations in wage with their spouses than black men. When using education as the marriage index (row 11 in tables 2 and 3), white and black men exhibit similar strati…cation patterns because of similar search e¢ciency. 25 Logarithms of wages are used to compute the wage correlation to adjust for skewedness. When the imputed wage for women is not used, the correlation is 0.472 and 0.376 for white men and black men respectively.
26 I am aware of the systematic di¤erence in wage during life cycle. I reestimate the model using standardized wage (by mean age); and I also use the present value of expected income as agents' trait. I …nd that there is no qualitative di¤erence in results.
Once classi…cation error is accounted for, matching is more assorted using wage as the only marriageable trait rather than education, except for the age group 41-65. 27 For example, the marriage market ‡exibility for white men equals 2 4 when = 0 and 14 23 when = 1. This result contrasts with the simple wage correlation in subsection 4.2 that suggests spouses are sorted similarly in wage and education. This result and the signi…cance of classi…cation error probabilities indicate the empirical importance of accounting for classi…cation errors.
When using both wage and education (row 16), a signi…cant racial contrast in the relative importance of wage occurs: 0.816 and 0.031 for white men and black men respectively. 28 This indicates that wage has a greater impact on white men's desirability as marriage partners, whereas education constitutes almost all marriageability for black men. Alternatively, as wage represents temporal income and education represents permanent income, can be interpreted as the time rate of preference. The high of white men implies that white men are more impatient than black men, which is consistent with the result of a higher + that leads to a more e¢cient market for black men 29 Likelihood ratio tests reject speci…cations using only one trait. 27 Results from a benchmark model (without classi…cation errors) show that in all speci…cations, black men have lower partners' arrival and separation rates than white men. The estimates of for black and white men are 0.039 and 0.034 respectively when = 1 and 0.032 and 0.027 respectively when = 0 So the acceptance sets for both race groups range from the lowest to the highest type. That is to say, sample individuals scramble for partners, and the acceptance probability is one. The values of market e¢ciency are found to be close to zero, indicating that search friction is high. 28 Results on the estimates of may be a¤ected by using imputed wages for non-working women (27 percent in the sample). Because people may self-select to not working, assigning them positive wages leads to an over-estimation of So, the estimated explanatory power of wage may be too large. Even if only agents of positive wages are included, over-estimation of would still occur and wage as a marriageable trait tends to predict more assortative mating. However, results from Monte Carlo simulations indicate that is under-estimated. So, the net e¤ect of over-and under-estimation of may cancel out. 29 Comparisons of these results to those from the benchmark model reveal signi…cant shifts of the estimate of : from 0.005 to 0.807 for white men, and from 0.005 to 0.031 for black men. The estimates of become higher but those of smaller in the classi…cation error model. The opposite movements of the estimates of and allow more assortative matching as described in section 2. When classi…cation errors are incorporated in the model, the transition parameters adjust to allow for more assortative matching. insert table 2 To examine whether there exists heterogeneity of search behavior across age groups, I stratify the sample by four age groups: 15-21, 22-30, 31-40, and 41-65. Within each age group, type described by both wage and education is signi…cantly di¤erent from models when only wage or education is used. Besides, the marriage market for white men is most e¢cient when using both traits, while the picture for black men is less clear.
When examining across age groups for 2 (0 1), wage demonstrates itself as a better representation of white men's marriageability, except for the age group 31-40.
In contrast, education is a more desirable marriageable trait for black men except those between the ages of 15 and 20 (rows 12-16, table 3).   insert table 3 Interestingly, there is a striking racial contrast in results from the e¤ects of classi…cation errors and market e¢ciency across age groups. Results for white men show that the chance of being classi…ed incorrectly increases with age. Further, the marriage market of younger white men is more e¢cient than that for older agents except for = 0 in table 2. However, there is no tractable e¤ect of age for black men.
Given a particular speci…cation of both 0 and ( + ) may increase or decrease with age. For example, using wage only as a marriage index reveals little about older black men's marriageability ( 0 is low), but it reveals considerable information about young black agents' marriageability. As education or a combination of wage and education is used as a marriage index, black men of age groups 22-30 and 31-40 are more prone to classi…cation errors. A mixture of results is also found for the marriage e¢ciency of black men. The market is more e¢cient at both ends of the age distribution when education is the marriageable trait. But when wage only is used, the market is more e¢cient for age groups 22-30 and 31-40. At 2 (0 1) younger black men have a more e¢cient market; this result resembles that of white men.
On comparing the sum of the maximum log likelihoods by age groups (rows 12 to 15) to the maximum log likelihood using the restricted model (row 16), the hypothesis of homogeneity across subsamples is clearly rejected. This result is found in all speci…cations for white and black men.
The estimated acceptance sets for white and black men are shown in …gures 1-6.
The data are generated following (11) and are based on the estimates in rows 6, 11, and 16 of tables 2 and 3. From the speci…cations of match production of and sexual symmetry in parameters and disjoint "marriage classes" in the spirit of Coles (1999, 1997) are expected. When wage is the only determinant of the marriage index, there are three marriage classes and they are asymmetric (…gure 1). The asymmetry is due to the substantial di¤erence in wage distribution between white men and women. White men's types who are type …ve or above accounts for more than …ve percent from the sample, while it is about 3 percent for women.
Because there is more high type white men than high type women, high type women are more picky than men. Women of type …ve through type ten have acceptance sets: =5 = f j = 5 10g = =6 = = =10 while white men of type …ve through type ten have acceptance sets: =5 = f j = 4 10g = =6 = = =10 These acceptance sets form the …rst marriage class. The second marriage class is made up of type two and three women and type three and four men. The last marriage class is made up of type one women and type two men. Because women are picky, type one men remain single in this equilibrium.
Because search friction is highest when education is used as the marriage index, white men are the least sorted: type three through type ten agents share the same acceptance set, and types one and two agents are sorted with their own type (…gure 2). When both wage and education are considered, there are four marriage classes for white men. Men and women of type four through type ten are in the same class, and strict sorting occurs in the rest of the three types (…gure 3). Because the market is most ‡exible in this case, agents are most sorted.
Given a higher search friction, the marriage market for black men is less sorted.
In all speci…cations, similar o¤er arrivals lead to same acceptance sets of black men, with three marriage classes in each model (…gures 4 to 6).
insert …gures 1-6
The matching model posts strong assumptions on the distribution of singlehood and marriage spells: both follow exponential distributions with intensity parameters Results are shown in table 4. The exponential model …ts the singlehood spells of black men quite well (columns 4 to 6). The shape parameter in singlehood spells is fairly close to one and the asymptotic con…dence interval straddles 1.0 for 1 However, the model has di¢culty in …tting black men's marriage spells and white men's singlehood and marriage spells data. Results for black men's marriage spells show that the standard errors of are enormous. These results raise suspicion of the model …tness even though the asymptotic con…dence interval covers one when = (0 1) and it is right around one to two decimal points at the corner cases (columns 4 to 6). The estimates for singlehood and marriage spells for white men are around 0.4 and 0.6 respectively for 0 exhibiting decreasing singlehood and marriage hazards (columns 1 to 3). These results re ‡ect that singlehood (marriage) tenure is negatively associated with the marriage (separation) hazard. Such duration dependence may be spurious, and unobserved heterogeneity may be required to im-prove the …t of the model. Another way to improve the …t to marriage spells data is to discard the assumption of the exogenous separation as the only match termination mechanism. Exogenous separation can underestimate the transition rate from marriage to separation. To obtain a reasonable estimate of the transition rate of separation, one may need to extend the model to introduce endogenous separation.
Conclusion
This paper is the …rst step in an attempt to examine empirical issues involved in structural estimation of a marriage model. The approach requires estimation of agents' types and their reservation types, as a means of determining the deeper behavioral parameters. Classi…cation errors will a¤ect these estimates. My approach in this paper retains the behavioral matching model while adding classi…cation errors. An application to data from the PSID shows that the model can be interpreted straightforwardly. Results reject the use of a single trait in determining agents' types, and favor the use of a mixture of measured traits and classi…cation errors. White men are found to be more impatient and their marriage market more ‡exible than black men. Despite that wage is found to be a more desirable marriageable trait than education for white men, its desirability decreases with age. The results indicate no tractable e¤ects of age for black men. These results show that the improvement in understanding who marries whom is gained by adopting structural estimation.
The advantage of the proposed method to account for unobserved heterogeneity is that it is ‡exible. An alternative way is to consider stochastic match production.
But this might introduce a substantial computation burden in solving the dynamic programming problem. Although this paper provides an intuitively appealing method to estimate a matching model, it is clear that the separation process assumed by the model is not realistic. The exogenous match destruction does not incorporate shocks that lead to destruction. More complex models to incorporate endogenous match destruction may be required for future research.
Appendix. Derivation of the reservation type
From (1), we have
Substitute (2) into A1 to obtain
The optimal policy gives 2( + ) + ( ) ( + ) = ( ) which can be simpli…ed to obtain who have married once with current age no more than two years from the …rst age at marriage, and who have no children. Age is limited to those between 15 and 64, with 15 being the o¢cial marriageable age de…ned by the Census.
Some cares need to be taken in order to obtain meaningful wage correlation between spouses. To reduce measurement errors for wages, wage is trimmed using top-codes provided by the Census and the minimum hourly wage documented by the Bureau of Census. Those with wages that do not fall within admissible ranges are treated as missing. Wages used are weekly wages, and thus the minimum hourly wage is multiplied by 35 hours to get the lower wage bound.
